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1. Introduction
In a globalizing world with its rapid technological progress and environmental degradation,
ever larger parts of our lives are exposed to non-calculable risk or, as it is often referred
to, ambiguity. Such risks range from natural disasters and the spread of unknown diseases
to instable regimes and terrorist attacks. Financial decisions are exposed to the eects of
ambiguity as well, though it may not always be recognized as such. In this paper, we relate
the prevalence of specic forms of nancial intermediation to the degree of ambiguity faced
by investors. This allows us to shed a new light on two familiar observations. Firstly, the
consensus-oriented economies of Germany and Japan operate bank-based nancial systems, as
opposed to the market-based systems of the UK and the USA4. Secondly, it proves dicult
to establish private sector nancial intermediation in countries with a weak rule of law and
signicant (incalculable) political risks5. In the setting of our model, we nd that when
investors face small amounts of ambiguity, as in consensus-oriented economies, competitive
banks are preferred to nancial markets. For intermediate degrees of ambiguity, as may be
found in the UK and the USA, this preference reverses. For high levels of incalculable risk,
which prevail in developing countries, neither banks nor markets can improve on the outcome
obtained in the absence of nancial intermediation.
Many economic activities depend crucially on facilities enabling economic agents to raise liquid
funds against claims on their future income. Future income streams are by nature uncertain
and, therefore, dicult to contract on. Hence, we nd a plethora of nancial institutions
serving the purpose of providing liquidity, ranging from credit contracts, which allow customers
to raise liquid funds against claims on future payments, to secondary asset markets, in which
organized trade of illiquid assets can take place. In the case of credit contracts, loans require
sucient collateral or a more or less complicated assessment procedure of future payments.
Secondary asset markets can be established for homogeneous asset categories with suciently
regular demand and supply that justify the costs of an organized market. Bank deposit
contracts are a special instrument of liquidity provision. Banks accept deposits of liquid funds
and promise to repay liquid funds in the future at any time the depositor claims them back.
Deposits oer banks the opportunity to invest at least part of these funds in illiquid assets,
since on average only a fraction of deposits will be called upon in any period.
In this paper, we contrast two institutional arrangements for liquidity provision: a bank deposit
4See, e.g. Edwards and Fischer (1994).
5See, e.g. Levine (1997).
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contract as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and a secondary asset market as in Diamond
(1997) and Allen and Gale (2004). Diculties with liquidity provision arise from the inherent
uncertainty about asset returns, but also from uncertainty about individual and aggregate
liquidity needs. We will focus here on uncertainty about individual and aggregate liquidity
needs and will disregard uncertainty about asset returns6.
In most of the existing economic literature, uncertainty is viewed as ignorance about the
outcome of a random draw from a known probability distribution, where the known probability
distribution is identied with the actual frequency of these outcomes in a population. For
example, consumers assume that preference parameters, which determine their private liquidity
needs in the future, are randomly drawn with probabilities equal to the actual frequencies of
these preference parameters in the population.
We will show that ambiguity about these distributions can change well-known results of the
literature on nancial intermediation. In particular, we will argue that institutional arrange-
ments, such as bank deposit contracts and secondary asset markets, are quite distinct in their
robustness with respect to investors' ambiguity about individual and aggregate liquidity needs.
1.1. Modelling ambiguity. Uncertainty has long been recognized as an important fac-
tor determining economic activities. The distinction between risk, i.e., situations where the
probabilities of events are known, and ambiguity, i.e., situations where this is not the case, has
served Knight (1921) as the foremost explanation of economic phenomena such as prot and
entrepreneurial activity.
For several decades the behaviorist theory of subjective expected utility by Savage (1954)
appeared to have rendered this distinction obsolete. If individuals faced with uncertainty
behave as if they held a subjective probability distribution over events, then, from an analytical
point of view, behavior under risk and under uncertainty can be treated in the same way. Yet
early evidence by Ellsberg (1961) suggested that the hypothesis of a well-dened subjective
probability distribution cannot be maintained empirically. Systematic laboratory experiments
have conrmed Ellsberg's conjecture, see Camerer and Weber (1992). It appears to be well-
established now that certain aspects of uncertainty cannot be captured by the assumption of
a subjective probability distribution.
Despite these inconsistencies with actual behavior under uncertainty, expected utility theory
has proved to be a very successful modelling tool. Important economic insights were obtained
6The impact of uncertain asset returns is addressed in Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988).
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from the distinction between risk preferences and beliefs. We believe, however, that there
are economic situations where the ambiguity of agents aects economic performance in a way
which can be tested empirically and where the success of economic policies depend on whether
one takes the ambiguity of economic agents appropriately into account7.
In recent years, substantial progress has been made in modelling decision-making under un-
certainty without subjective probabilities. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) proposed a
theory where decision makers' beliefs are represented by non-additive probabilities (or capac-
ities). Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory, a generalization of subjective expected utility,
can accommodate many dierent weighting schemes for events while maintaining some sepa-
ration of beliefs and outcome evaluation, which is important in economic applications in order
to identify risk preferences8.
Generalizing additive beliefs to non-additive beliefs allows one to accommodate empirically ob-
served anomalies like, e.g., the Ellsberg-paradox9. Without imposing additional restrictions on
capacities, however, predictions about economic behavior are typically less precise. Eichberger
and Kelsey (1999) and Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2004) study special classes of ca-
pacities which restrict the number of free parameters10 and provide economic interpretations
for them.
In this paper, we will restrict attention to beliefs that can be represented by simple capac-
ities. Simple capacities are convex combinations of an additive probability distribution and
the capacity of complete ignorance. They reduce the large number of free parameters, which
are typical for general capacities. Moreover, since a simple capacity is convex, a CEU de-
cision maker can also be viewed as a pessimist with beliefs described by a set of multiple
additive prior distributions. Simple capacities are a special case of E-capacities which are
studied in Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) and of NEO-additive capacities which are analyzed
and axiomatized in Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2004).
With a simple capacity, the Choquet expected utility of an act is a weighted average of the
expected utility of this act with respect to an additive probability distribution and the min-
7See, e.g. Kelsey and Spanjers (2004) on small rms, Spanjers (2006) and Ghatak and Spanjers (2007) on
monetary policy and Spanjers (2007) on currency crises.
8Further developments include the unication of the approaches of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987)
(Sarin and Wakker (1992)), applications to portfolio choice (Dow and Werlang (1992)) and game theory (Mari-
nacci (2000)), and a concept of ambiguity aversion (Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)).
9See Ellsberg (1961).
10These capacities satisfy further desiderata like compatibility with themultiple prior approach (Chateauneuf,
Eichberger and Grant (2004)), a reasonable support notion (Eichberger and Kelsey (2003)), and consistent
updating rules (Eichberger, Grant and Kelsey (2004)).
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imum utility obtainable with the act. The weight attached to the expected utility part can
be interpreted as the degree of condence of the decision maker in the additive probability.
Hence, one can give ambiguity and condence a parametric interpretation.
1.2. Liquidity and nancial intermediation. According to Diamond and Dybvig's sem-
inal article, liquidity problems arise because consumers, who do not know their private liquidity
needs in future periods, have to decide on investments which require a long-term commitment
of their funds11. Since liquidity needs are private information, direct contracting is impossible
and an agency problem arises. In this context, one can raise and answer important questions
about the institutional design of nancial intermediation and its regulation.
The earlier literature assumes that the illiquid asset can be liquidated at par12. With this
assumption, there is no liquidity problem but an incompleteness of contract due to unrealized
insurance opportunities which can be accommodated by a bank deposit contract. The more
recent literature assumes that the illiquid asset cannot be liquidated at all. Hence, a combined
problem of insucient liquidity and incomplete insurance contracts arises13. Diamond (1997)
shows that secondary asset markets can resolve the liquidity problem but cannot provide the
necessary cross subsidy in order to deal with the incomplete insurance issue. In contrast, a
bank deposit contract can solve both problems and implement the optimal contract. A central
question in this literature concerns the precarious coexistence of banks and secondary asset
markets. Diamond (1997) and Allen and Gale (2004) assume restricted access of consumers
to the secondary asset market. With restricted market participation consumers can secure
liquidity and obtain, at least partially, the cross subsidy required by the optimal contract.
In this paper, we will assume that the illiquid asset can be liquidated at some cost. Compared
to the literature, this is an intermediate case. There is a liquidity problem, but there can be
no perfect commitment not to liquidate early, which is implied in the assumption of Diamond
(1997) that the illiquid asset cannot be liquidated at all. Though we assume that consumers
have risk neutral preferences, as in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), a cross subsidy problem
occurs if some consumers' return from holding the liquid asset exceeds the return on the
illiquid asset. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) the optimal contract requires a cross subsidy
from consumers with low liquidity needs to consumers with high liquidity needs, yet not for
insurance reasons. Hence, disregarding ambiguity, we obtain the results of Diamond (1997).
11See Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
12See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Jacklin (1987).
13See Diamond (1997) and Allen and Gale (2004).
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The main contribution of this paper consists in its analysis of the role of ambiguity and con-
dence for intermediary institutions. Comparing bank deposits and secondary asset markets,
we obtain the following results. In the presence of ambiguity, neither bank deposit contracts
nor the asset market implement the ex-ante optimal allocation of liquidity. The evaluation of
institutions depends on the degree of consumers' condence regarding the probability distri-
bution over private and aggregate liquidity needs. With low condence, neither bank deposits
nor asset trading can improve upon the allocation without intermediation. For middle levels
of condence, a secondary asset market is the preferred institution. If the level of ambiguity is
low, and hence condence is high, bank deposit contracts oer the ex-ante preferred method
of liquidity provision.
1.3. Organization of the paper. In the following section, we dene simple capacities
and embed the decision criteria used in this paper in the more general theory of capacities and
the Choquet integral. Section 3 describes the economic model, analyzes individual behavior
without intermediation, and studies the optimal incentive-compatible allocation. The following
two sections deal with the secondary asset market and the bank deposit contract, respectively.
Section 6 compares the performance of these institutions under ambiguity, Section 7 contains
concluding remarks. Longer proofs are gathered in an appendix.
2. Ambiguous beliefs
Simple capacities form a special class of capacities. Consider a state space S which is a compact
subset of Rn and let p be an additive probability distribution on S: A simple capacity ; based
on the additive probability distribution p; is the set function dened by
(E) =
8<:
  p(E) for E  S
1 for E = S
for any p-measurable set E and some  2 [0; 1]: For  = 1 the simple capacity coincides with
the additive probability distribution p: The parameter  can be interpreted as the degree of
condence in the additive probability distribution p:We call  := 1  the degree of ambiguity.
Simple capacities maintain many properties of additive probability distributions and have a
natural interpretation in terms of beliefs. The degree of ambiguity  reects the deviation
from the additive probability distribution p. In this interpretation, ambiguity is simply the
counterpart of the decision maker's condence in a probabilistic assessment.
Consider a p-measurable function f : S ! R: The Choquet integral of f with respect to a
simple capacity ; the Choquet expected value of f; is the convex combination with weight
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 of the expected utility of f with respect to the probability distribution p and the worst
outcome of f on S. The following result is proved in Eichberger and Kelsey (1999, Proposition
2.1).
Proposition 1. Choquet integral of a simple capacity
Consider a simple capacity  with the additive probability distribution p: The Choquet integral
CEU(f; ) of a p-measurable function f with respect to the simple capacity  has the following
form:
CEU(f; ) =  
Z
S
f dp+  min
s2S
f(s): (1)
Proposition 1 oers an intuitive and parsimonious preference representation14 of a decision
maker facing ambiguity about p. For the case of full condence,  = 1; one has the familiar
expected utility form. As ambiguity increases,  ! 1; and condence in p falls,  ! 0; more
weight is given to the worst outcome of f on S: For  = 0; the maximin decision rule obtains.
The Choquet integral of a simple capacity models ambiguity in a special way. We feel, however,
that this payo description captures at least some aspects of Knight's ideas15.
3. The economy
We consider an economy with many, relative to the market, small consumers16. This is mod-
elled by the assumption of a continuum set of consumers, the interval [0; 1]: The economy
extends over three periods. In Period 0; each consumer is endowed with one unit of wealth
(money) and faces the following investment opportunities:
Payo in
Assets Period 0 Period 1 Period 2
1. Asset matured  1 0 2
Asset liquidated  1 1 0
2. Money 0 to 1  1 1 0
Money 1 to 2 0  1 1
We assume 2 > 1 > 1: This payo structure justies calling the asset illiquid. The asset
oers a long-term investment possibility with a better return than money, if held to maturity
in Period 2: Compared to money it is illiquid, however, since the liquidation payo 1 in Period
1 falls short of the return from holding money. Uncertainty about liquidity needs is the focus
14A simple capacity is a special case of a NEO-additive capacity which has been axiomatised in Chateauneuf,
Eichberger and Grant (2004).
15See Knight (1921).
16The basic structure of the model (disregarding ambigous beliefs), follows Eichberger (1992).
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of this paper. We abstract, therefore, from uncertainty about the payos of the assets17.
There are two types of ex-ante identical consumers. In Period 1; consumers privately learn
their type t 2 fh; `g: The type of a consumer determines his preference for liquidity in Period
1: Type-dependent preferences are represented by a risk-neutral von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility index
u(z1; z2; t) = t  z1 + z2
where z1 and z2 denote consumption in Period 1 and Period 2; respectively. Throughout the
paper, the following assumption about the parameter values of our model is maintained.
Assumption 1. Liquidity preference
(i) h > 2 > `  1;
(ii) 2 > 1  h:
According to Assumption 1 (i), consumers of type h strictly prefer to hold money, while
consumers of type ` prefer an investment in the illiquid asset. Assumption 1 (ii) guarantees
that the liquidation value of the illiquid asset 1 is so low that it does not pay for a consumer
with high liquidity needs to liquidate an investment in the illiquid asset in Period 1: This
part of Assumption 1 is not strictly necessary for our analysis. It is however useful for the
exposition since it allows us to skip discussing several cases which are of little interest.
The liquidation value 1 2 (0; 1) falls between two extreme cases. In Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) the long-term asset has the same liquidity as money, 1 = 1; while in Diamond (1997)
the illiquid asset has no payo in Period 1, 1 = 0: In our paper, consumers are not risk-
averse. Hence, we need to assume some illiquidity 1 < 1; for, otherwise, the payos of the
illiquid asset would simply dominate holding money. A liquidation rate 1 = 0 forms the other
extreme. Diamond (1997) makes this assumption because he considers a secondary market for
claims to the illiquid asset18. The market price in the secondary market can be viewed as an
endogenously determined liquidation rate 1.
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), it is assumed that the probability of a consumer being
assigned a particular type equals the proportion of this type in the economy. In addition, we
17Spanjers (1999, Chapter 5) extends the comparison between banks and asset markets to the case of ambi-
guity about the illiquid asset's return.
18For 1 = 0; liquidation is impossible. Hence, any scheme which collects funds in Period 0 and redistributes
them in Period 1 can perfectly commit to not liquidating early in favor of early consumers at the expense of
late customers. This assumption will be important below, when we consider the deposit contract, and will be
discussed in more detail there.
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will assume that there is also uncertainty about the proportion of consumers of either type.
Hence, in Period 0; both individual and aggregate liquidity needs are unknown.
Denote by  the unknown proportion of consumers with high liquidity needs h: In Period 0;
consumers know neither their type t nor the proportion  of h-types in the population. While
the proportion of consumers with high liquidity needs  becomes common knowledge in Period
1; consumers learn only privately the information about their type t:
Beliefs of consumers are represented by a subjective joint probability distribution P over the
unknown parameters (t; ) 2 fh; `g  [0; 1]. Ambiguity is modelled as lack of condence  in
this additive probability distribution P . The following assumption characterizes the beliefs of
consumers.
Assumption 2. Beliefs
1. Population shares:
Conditional on the population share  the probability distribution over types t equals
the proportions of types in the economy, whenever this conditional probability is well-
dened,
P (hj) =  and P (`j) = 1   :
2. Correct beliefs:
Consumers' marginal beliefs about the population share of h-types are concentrated on
the true proportion ,
p() =

1 for   
0 otherwise
;
where p() denotes a cumulative distribution function on the set of population shares
for the h-types, [0; 1]:
In order to make our results comparable with the literature, e.g. with Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Jacklin (1987), Diamond (1997) and Allen and Gale (2004), beliefs about the proportion
of consumers with high liquidity needs are identied with their actual population share :
Though consumers have point predictions for the population shares of each type, which will
turn out to be correct in Period 1; they may still experience ambiguity about these predictions
in Period 0:
Assumption 2 implies the following joint probability distribution:
P (h; ) =
8<:
 if  = 
0 otherwise
; P (`; ) =
8<:
1   if  = 
0 otherwise
:
Liquidity and Ambiguity: Banks or Asset Markets? 10
3.1. Investment without intermediation. If there are no intermediary institutions,
then each consumer simply decides on the fraction of wealth m to be held as money and
on the fraction to be invested in the illiquid asset, 1  m. This decision yields consumption
(z1; z2) = (m;2 (1 m)) and, for type t; the utility u(m;2 (1 m); t) = t m+2 (1 m):
By Assumption 1 (ii), 2 > 1  h; we need not consider the case of consumers wanting to
liquidate their long-term investment.
In Period 0; when consumers have to choose their investment strategy m; they are uncertain
both about their type t and the proportion of types in the population,  . If the proportion
of type h consumers  were known, the ex-ante expected utility of a consumer would be
[  h + (1   )  `]  m + 2  (1   m): If consumers lack condence in the probability
distribution P (t; ); i.e.,  < 1; then the ex-ante Choquet expected utility of a consumer is
CEU(m; ) =   [(  h + (1  )  `) m+ 2  (1 m)]
+(1  )  min
(t;)2fh;`g[0;1]
[t m+ 2  (1 m)]
= [    h + (1    )  `] m+ 2  (1 m):
Maximizing CEU(m; ) over m 2 [0; 1] yields the maximal ex-ante Choquet expected utility
as a function of the degree of condence ; a result which we summarize in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In an economy without intermediation, the optimal investment policy
mn() =
8>>><>>>:
0 for    < 2 `h `
2 [0; 1] for    = 2 `h `
1 for    > 2 `h `
;
yields the maximal ex-ante Choquet expected utility
V n () = CEUn(m

n(); ) = maxf2 ;     h + (1    )  `g:
Consumers of type h prefer to hold money in Period 1. Hence, money holding is the optimal
investment policy if both the assessed probability of becoming a consumer with high liquidity
needs, ; and the degree of condence in this belief, , are suciently high. Otherwise, all
money is invested in the illiquid asset.
Since the illiquid asset has a certain return 2; it is the preferred choice if the low type ` is
realized. Hence, it becomes the default option for consumers with a high degree of ambiguity.
Clearly, money would become the default option for low condence if the illiquid asset had an
uncertain return.
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3.2. Optimal contract. The allocation which consumers can generate individually in this
economy is suboptimal. Even taking into account the informational constraints, there is scope
for Pareto improvements by pooling resources in Period 0 and investing them jointly. If
there was no uncertainty,  = 1; consumers could pool their funds in Period 0 and invest
the proportion (1   ) in the illiquid asset, holding the rest  as money. This investment
strategy would allow them to pay out a unit of money to the consumers with high liquidity
need in Period 1 and the amount 2 to consumers with low liquidity needs in Period 2: This
would yield an expected utility exceeding the expected utility which consumers can guarantee
themselves,
  h + (1  )  2 > V n (1):
As Diamond (1997) points out this pure liquidity provision, though improving upon autarky,
is not optimal. Since the type of a consumer is private information and since we consider
uncertainty about individual and aggregate liquidity needs, such an asset pooling scheme
needs to be studied carefully.
For an optimal allocation, the resources of all consumers are pooled in Period 0 and optimally
invested in money and the illiquid asset. In Period 0; before types t 2 fh; `g are privately
known and before the proportion of types  is common knowledge, all consumers are iden-
tical. In Period 1 all uncertainty is resolved, however, consumers' types are not publicly
known. Hence, the optimal contract will assign type-contingent payouts, zh = (z1h; z2h) and
z` = (z1`; z2`); subject to self-selection constraints, which reect the private information of con-
sumers. Moreover, an optimal allocation must maximize individual utility without ignoring
the informational asymmetry.
In Period 1; the optimal type-contingent payout scheme (zh; z`) will maximize the average
utility of consumers given the, then known, public information about the population share.
The average utility for a population with a fraction  of h type consumers is
U(zh; z`; ) =   u(zh;h) + (1  )  u(z`; `)
=   [h  z1h + z2h] + (1  )  [`  z1` + z2`]: (2)
The choice problem of the optimal contract has two stages. In Period 0; the fraction M of
aggregate wealth held as money is determined. The remaining wealth is invested in the illiquid
asset. In Period 1, once the investment decision M has been taken and once the proportion
of h type consumers,  2 [0; 1]; has become public knowledge, the type-contingent payouts
(zh; z`) are determined. We analyze these two stages in turn.
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The optimal payout scheme. Given the aggregate money holdings M and a realized pro-
portion  of h type consumers, the optimal payout scheme (zh; z`) must maximize consumers'
average utility subject to self-selection and feasibility constraints:
max
zh;z`
U(zh; z`; )
s.t. h  z1h + z2h  h  z1` + z2`; Sh
`  z1` + z2`  `  z1h + z2h; S `
  z1h + (1  )  z1` = M; F 1
  z2h + (1  )  z2` = 2  (1 M); F 2
z1h  0; z1`  0; z2h  0; z2`  0:
(3)
The feasibility constraints, F 1 and F 2; guarantee that aggregate payouts in periods 1 and 2
can be nanced given the investment policyM: According to Assumption 1 (ii), it can never be
optimal to liquidate the long-term investment in Period 1; hence this possibility is disregarded
in decision problem (3). Incentive-compatibility of the payout scheme follows from the two
self selection constraints Sh and S `:
Disregarding the self-selection constraints Sh and S `; one optimal allocation would be ez1` = 0;ez1h = M ; ez2h = 0 and ez2` = 2(1 M)1  ; yielding the optimal average utility
U(M; ) = h M + 2  (1 M): (4)
For given initial money holdings M , however, it depends on  whether this solution satises
the self-selection constraints. The constraint Sh will be binding for h  M < 2(1 M)1  ; i.e., for
 >
h M
h M + 2  (1 M)
= (M):
The other incentive constraint S ` will bind, if
2(1 M)
1  < `  M holds, i.e., if
 <
` M
` M + 2  (1 M)
= (M): (5)
The optimal solution from Equation (4) is valid for all  2 [(M); (M)]:
From the linearity of the average utility function U(zh; z`; ) in Equation (2) it is immediately
clear that the optimal allocation fails to be unique at an optimum where the self-selection
constraints are not binding. Any second-period consumption allocation (z2h; z2`) satisfying
the self-selection constraints and the constraint   z2h + (1   )  z2` = 2  (1  M) would
also be optimal. It is therefore possible to transfer second-period consumption from `-type to
h-type consumers at no cost in terms of the average utility. Hence, the optimal average utility
of Equation (4) remains unchanged for  > (M):
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In contrast, if the constraint S ` is binding, then one has to decrease rst-period consumption of
consumers with high liquidity needs and increase rst-period consumption of `-type consumers
in order to satisfy the self-selection constraints.
For  < (M); one obtains the optimal allocation ez1h = M + 2`  (1  M); ez1` = M   1  
2
`
 (1 M); ez2h = 0 and ez2` = 21   (1 M) yielding an average utility of
U(M; ) =  

h 

M +
2  (1 M)
`

+(1  ) 

` 

M   
1   
2  (1 M)
`

+
2  (1 M)
1  

(6)
=
(  h + (1  )  `)
`
[` M + 2  (1 M)] :
In summary, the maximal average utility obtainable with an optimal contract is a function of
the population share of h-type consumers  and the investment M made in Period 0:
U(M; ) =
8><>:
( h+(1 )`)
`
 [` M + 2  (1 M)] for  < (M)
h M + 2  (1 M) otherwise
: (7)
The optimal investment policy. In Period 0; when consumers are still uncertain about
their types and the proportion of types  ; one obtains the Choquet expected value of an invest-
ment decision M by taking the Choquet integral of the average utility U(M; ) in Equation
(7). Notice that information about the types of consumers is not necessary for the optimal
investment choice. This information becomes relevant in Period 1; when consumers privately
know their types. The payout scheme derived in the previous subsection will guarantee truthful
revelation of this information.
For any number " 2 [0; 1]; denote by (") = "  h + (1  ")  ` the expected return on money
holdings in Period 1: By Assumption 2 the marginal probability distribution over population
shares of the h-type consumers is concentrated on the true proportion : Hence, U(M;) is
the expected average utility of a consumer in Period 0: The ex-ante worst case is obtained for
the combination t = L and  = 0 and yields a utility of U(M; 0): Given a degree of condence
; the the ex-ante Choquet expected utility function is
CEUo(M ; ) =   U(M;) + (1  )  U(M; 0) (8)
=
8><>:
()
`
 [` M + 2  (1 M)] for  < (M)
() M + 2  (1 M) otherwise
:
The optimal investment policy M will be chosen to maximize CEUo(M ; ) over all M 2 [0; 1]:
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Condition  < (M) in Equation (5) is equivalent to the condition
M >
  2
2   + (1  )  `
=M():
Figure 1 shows the Choquet expected utility function of Equation (8).
M0
CEU
...............................
1M()
2
......................................
() ................................................
2()
2+(1 )`
CEUo(M ; )
Figure 1: Optimal reserves
It is immediately obvious that the optimal fraction of wealth held as money is
Mo () =
8<:
M() for () > 2
2 [0;M()] for () = 2
0 for () < 2
:
Substituting the optimal investment choice in the Choquet expected utility function, CEUo(M

o (); );
yields the optimal ex-ante Choquet expected utility as a function of the degree of condence
:
We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The maximal Choquet expected utility from an optimal contract is
V o () = CEUo(M

o (); )
= 2 max

(  )
2   + (1  )  `
; 1

=
8>><>>:
2  (  )
2   + (1  )  `
if () > 2
2 if ()  2
:
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The maximal ex-ante Choquet expected utility V n () obtainable for a consumer in the absence
of intermediary institutions was derived in Proposition 2. This value can be compared with
the Choquet expected utility V o () of an optimal contract from Proposition 3. Figure 2 shows
the ex-ante Choquet expected utility levels for these two cases.
0
CEU
1
...................
...................
o n
2
V n ()
V o ()
Figure 2: Optimal contract vs. no intermediation
The critical degrees of condence o =
2 `
h ` and n =
2 `
(h `) are obtained where (o ) =
2   + (1  )  ` and (n  ) = 2 hold, respectively.
The Choquet expected utility in the case of no intermediation forms a lower bound for the
ex-ante Choquet expected utility with any kind of voluntary intermediation. The optimal
contract, on the other hand, provides an upper bound for what any intermediary institution
can achieve.
In the following sections, we investigate dierent institutional settings. We compare an asset
market for the illiquid asset in Period 1 with a deposit contract oered by a competitive bank.
4. Asset market
As a rst institutional environment, suppose that in Period 1 consumers can sell claims to
their investment in the illiquid asset. The possibility to trade claims on the asset makes this
investment more liquid and provides an extra incentive to invest in it. As before, consumers
decide in Period 0 how much of their wealth to invest in the asset and how much to keep as
liquid money holdings.
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4.1. Market for claims in Period 1. Let us consider rst the market for claims to the
illiquid asset in Period 1: At this stage, the aggregate money holding M of consumers is given,
types are private knowledge and the actual proportion  of h-types is common knowledge.
Since all consumers are identical in Period 0; individual investment policies can be assumed
to equal their aggregates.
Denote by q the price of a claim to one unit of the illiquid asset in terms of money. If the price
is high enough, consumers of type h, who hold some illiquid asset, will try to sell it order to
benet from their high value for liquidity h. The aggregate supply of such claims is:
S(q) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1 M for q > 2`
[  (1 M); 1 M ] for q = 2`
  (1 M) for 2` > q >
2
h
[0;   (1 M)] for q = 2h
0 for 2h
> q
:
For high prices, q > 2`
; both types of consumers would like to sell their claims. For low prices,
2
h
> q; no one wants to sell them. In the price range (2h
; 2`
) only h-type consumers want to
sell their claims to the illiquid asset.
Similarly, consumers of type t want to buy securities for prices below 2t
. Hence, one obtains
the following aggregate demand:
D(q) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 for q > 2`
[0; (1  )  Mq ] for q = 2`
(1  )  Mq for 2` > q >
2
h
[(1  )  Mq ; Mq ] for q = 2h
M
q for q <
2
h
:
Figure 3 shows these demand and supply curves.
The market for claims clears for a price in the range [2h
; 2`
]: The equilibrium price qE depends
on the proportion of h types  and the aggregate investment policy M :
qE( ;M) =
8><>:
2
`
if  < M `M `+(1 M)2
1 
  M1 M if  2 [ M hM h+(1 M)2 ;
M `
M `+(1 M)2 ]
2
h
if  > M hM h+(1 M)2
: (9)
At an equilibrium price qE( ;M) 2 (2h ;
2
`
); all consumers of type h sell their claims and all
consumers of type ` use their money holdings to buy claims.
4.2. Investment decision in Period 0. We now turn to the investment decision in Pe-
riod 0: Since there is a continuum of consumers, a single consumer's share in the aggregate
investment is negligible. Hence, a consumer will take the market price of claims in Period 1;
qE( ;M); as given.
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quantity0
q
.....................................................
.................................................................
  (1 M)
.........................
S(q)
2
`
2
h
qE
D(q)
Figure 3: Market for claims to the illiquid asset
Given a price for claims on the illiquid asset of q in Period 1; denote by Rm(q; t) = maxft; 2q g
and Ra(q; t) = maxft  q; 2g the implicit returns in utility on holding one unit of money or
one unit of the illiquid asset, respectively. The indirect utility of a type t consumer who holds
m units of money and who expects a price of q for claims to the illiquid asset in Period 1,
bva(m; q; t); is bva(m; q; t) = m Rm(q; t) + (1 m) Ra(q; t):
The subscript a of the indirect utility function refers to the institutional framework of an asset
market.
A consumer's prediction of the equilibrium asset price qE( ;M) depends on the aggregate
money holdings M and the proportion of h-types  : Hence, indirect utility depends also on
these variables. In order to simplify notation, we write va(m;M; ; t) = bva(m; qE( ;M); t):
Uncertainty about type and proportion of types is modelled again by the degree of condence
 which consumers hold in the point expectation : Hence, one obtains the following Choquet
expected indirect utility:
CEUa(m;M;) =   [  va(m;M;; h) + (1  )  va(m;M;; `)]
+ (1  )  min
(t;)2fh;`g[0;1]
va(m;M; ; t):
Consumers choose their initial investment m to maximize CEUa(m;M;) given aggregate
money holdings M: In an equilibrium, aggregate money holdings M must be consistent with
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individual decisions m,
M =
Z 1
0
m di = m:
This consistency is equivalent to the assumption that there exists a price q for claims in Period
1 which clears the market and produces returns in utility on the two assets (Rm(q; t); Ra(q; t));
which makes consumers indierent about their initial investment given the uncertainty about
(t; ):
The following theorem shows that an equilibrium exists for any degree of condence  2 [0; 1]:
Proposition 4. Equilibrium in the asset market
There exists a unique equilibrium (qa();Ma ()) in the asset market satisfying
 qa() = 1 and Ma () = ; for  = 1;
 qa() 2 (2h ; 1) and M

a () 2 ( 22+(1 )h ; ) for  2 (o; 1);
 qa() = 2h and M

a () 2 [0; 22+(1 )h ]: for  2 [0; o];
yielding an ex-ante expected utility of
V a () =     qa()  h + (1    )  2: (10)
Proof. See the appendix.
In an asset market equilibrium, the price q of claims to the illiquid asset must full a dual role:
 it must clear the market in Period 1 for given holdings of money and the illiquid asset,
and
 it must yield equal Choquet expected returns from holding money and from investing in
the illiquid asset in Period 0.
If the latter condition were not satised, consumers would either hold only money or only the
illiquid asset, and no trade would occur in Period 1: We will demonstrate in Section 6 that
this dual task impairs the asset market's potential to achieve the optimal allocation in all but
the trivial case of an equilibrium without trade. As an institutional arrangement, however,
the asset market may dominate the other intermediary institutions.
If there is no ambiguity, for  = 1; the asset market price will be qa() = 1 and the ex-ante
expected utility is
V a (1) =   h + (1  )  2:
As in Diamond (1997) a secondary market for the illiquid asset can only provide liquidity
services but not the optimal cross-subsidy from investors with low liquidity needs to investors
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with high liquidity needs. Clearly, this provision of liquidity via the secondary claims market
improves upon the allocation which a consumer could provide in isolation,
V a (1) =   h + (1  )  2 > maxf2 ;     h + (1    )  `g = V n (1):
but it falls short of the potential payo possible according to the optimal contract,
V o (1) =
2  
2   + (1  )  `
 h > h >   h + (1  )  2 = V a (1):
5. Banks
In an alternative institutional arrangement, liquidity is provided by competing banks. Banks
collect funds from consumers, invest them jointly and, thus, can provide alternative payouts
in the two periods. The instrument to achieve this intertemporal allocation is the deposit
contract.
Bank deposit contracts can provide the cross-subsidy required by the optimal contract. In
contrast to the secondary asset market, however, deposit contracts are exposed to a risk of
coordination failure. If more depositors withdraw their deposits in Period 1 than provided for
by the bank, illiquid assets have to be liquidated at the unfavorable rate 1 in order to fulll
the deposit contract. Excess withdrawals in Period 1 diminish payouts on deposits in Period
2; which may induce long-term depositors to withdraw their funds early. In this section, we
will study how ambiguity about aggregate withdrawals aects a consumer's evaluation of the
deposit contract.
For a bank deposit contract, the liquidation possibility, 1 > 0; becomes essential. With
1 = 0; the bank would be unable to liquidate long-term investment in favor of early with-
drawals. Hence, long-term payos would not be aected. There would be no incentive for
long-term depositors to withdraw early, even if early withdrawers were to suer losses on their
deposits. With a secondary market for the illiquid asset, the equilibrium price would deter-
mine the liquidation rate endogenously. Studying a secondary market for the illiquid asset in
the presence of the bank deposit contract, as in Diamond (1997), would exceed the scope of
one paper.
5.1. The deposit contract. A deposit contract species repayments for both periods
according to the following rules:
1. Withdrawals in Period 1 are made on demand. They are treated as senior to withdrawals
in Period 2: If withdrawals in Period 1 exceed a bank's reserves, the bank will liquidate
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part or all of its long-term investment in the illiquid asset in order to satisfy depositors'
demand for liquid funds in Period 1:
2. Within each period, consumers have the same priority. If withdrawals exceed the re-
sources of the bank, then consumers calling back their deposits obtain a repayment
proportional to their initial deposit.
3. In Period 2 banks distribute their remaining wealth to depositors, who did not withdraw
in Period 1.
In Period 0; consumers deposit their wealth with banks. Banks decide on how to invest these
funds. Based on their prediction of withdrawals in Period 1; banks hold part of their deposits
as reserves in the form of money and invest the remainder in the illiquid asset. This policy
guarantees the contracted repayments in both periods, provided the bank predicts withdrawals
correctly and does not have to resort to the liquidation of illiquid assets. Free entry and
competition among banks about the terms of deposit contracts ensures zero prots. It also
guarantees an investment policy in the interest of depositors19. These assumptions allow us
to portray the competing banks by a representative bank.
Formally, the deposit contract of a bank is characterized by the interest rates (i1; i2) promised
for Periods 1 and 2, respectively. Since liquidation of funds invested in the illiquid asset is
costly, the bank holds reserves R equal to its payments predicted for Period 1: If the fraction
W0 of depositors withdraws their funds in Period 1; the bank has to pay out (1 + i1) W0:
Hence, the bank must hold reserves in terms of money equal to R = (1 + i1) W0: Remaining
deposits, 1   R; will be invested in the illiquid asset: In Period 2; competition forces the
bank to pay out all its returns from investment, 2  (1   R); to depositors who did not
withdraw in Period 1:With an initial amount of deposits equal to 1; the zero-prot condition,
(1 + i2)  (1 W0) = 2  (1 R); determines the interest rate i2: Hence, interest rates (i1; i2)
are functions of the bank's reserve policy R and predicted withdrawals W0,
i1(R;W0) =
R
W0
  1; i2(R;W0) = 2  1 R
1 W0   1: (11)
It is, however, the actual fraction of withdrawals in Period 1; W , together with the prior-
ity rules specied above, which determine the actual payos of deposits, 1(W ;R;W0) and
19Competition among banks is in the spirit of Allen and Gale (1998). For a more extensive discussion in a
similar context we refer to Spanjers (1999, Chapter 3).
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2(W ;R;W0); as
1(W ;R;W0) = minf
R
W0
;
R+ 1  (1 R)
W
g (12)
and
2(W ;R;W0) = max

0;
2
1 W 

(1 R) + 1
2
maxfW0  W; 0g   1
1
 R
W0
maxfW  W0; 0g

:
(13)
Equation (12) reects the priority rule that returns on deposits in Period 1 will be maintained
as long as possible, i.e., as long as [1 + i1(R;W0)] W = R
W0
W is less than R+ 1  (1 R),
the maximal amount of liquidity a bank can raise in Period 1: The actual return in Equation
(13) follows from the assumption that banks will distribute all their funds in Period 2:
W0

1
...................
W
...................................
..........
W0 =
R
1+i1
1(W ;R;W0)
2(W ;R;W0)
1 + i2
1 + i1 ...................fW
Figure 4: Actual returns of deposits
Figure 4 shows the actual returns of deposits as a function of the withdrawals in Period
1. Notice that, for W = W0; actual returns equal the promised returns, 1(W0;R;W0) =
1 + i1(R;W0) and 2(W0;R;W0) = 1 + i2(R;W0): Moreover, let W be the aggregate level
of withdrawals for which all assets have to be liquidated in order to maintain the return on
deposits in Period 1; W =
R+ 1  (1 R)
R
W0; then 2(W ;R;W0) = 0 holds.
According to the assumptions on asset returns made in Assumption 1, banks will not oer
interest rates on a deposit contract such that neither consumers with high liquidity needs nor
consumers with low liquidity demand will withdraw their deposits in Period 1: Hence, banks
will choose a reserve policy R; and associated interest rates, such that only consumers with
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high liquidity demand will withdraw their deposits in Period 1: With such a deposit contract
banks must prepare for withdrawals equal to the proportion of consumers with high liquidity
needs  .
We assume that banks have rational expectations regarding the proportion of consumers with
high liquidity needs. By Assumption 2, this implies
W0 =
Z
 dp() = :
Given believes about aggregate withdrawals in Period 1; W0 = ; the bank's reserve policy
R, and the implied deposit interest rates (i1(R; ); i2(R; )) according to Equation (11), must
guarantee that only consumers with high liquidity needs will want to withdraw their funds in
Period 1;
h  (1 + i1(R; ))  (1 + i2(R; ))  `  (1 + i1(R; )) : (14)
Equation (14) shows the incentive compatibility constraints which a bank's reserve policy R
must satisfy.
5.2. The depositor's problem. Consider a consumer who has deposited all funds with
the bank in Period 0: In Period 1 consumers learn their types, and the aggregate demand for liq-
uidity  becomes known as well. Type-h consumers will withdraw their funds if 2(W ;R; ) 
h  1(W ;R; ) holds. Otherwise they will leave their deposits in the bank. Similarly, con-
sumers of type ` will not withdraw their deposits for `  1(W ;R; )  2(W ;R; ): Hence,
one can summarize the aggregate withdrawal behavior by
W(W ;R) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if 2(W ;R; ) < `  1(W ;R; )
[ ; 1] if 2(W ;R; ) = `  1(W ;R; )
 if `  1(W ;R; ) < 2(W ;R; ) < h  1(W ;R; )
[0;  ] if h  1(W ;R; ) = 2(W ;R; )
0 if h  1(W ;R; ) < 2(W ;R; )
:
Aggregate withdrawals W  are a Nash equilibrium if they are a xed point of W(W ;R), i.e.
W(W ;R) =W .
Figure 4 shows the return functions 1(W ;R; ) and 2(W ;R; ): For the special case of
` = 1; one can use this diagram to check for which levels of W there is an equilibrium. Given
our assumptions on the asset payouts, the return functions intersect just once at the level of
withdrawals fW:
In general, the critical level of withdrawals fW occurs if the proportion of consumers with high
liquidity needs exceeds the bank's reserves such that second-period returns on deposits 2 fall
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Figure 5: Withdrawal equilibria
to a level where consumers with low liquidity needs become indierent between withdrawing
and leaving their deposits in the bank, `  1(fW ;R; ) = 2(fW ;R; ):
Hence, it is obvious that there are two types of equilibria20:
(i) W( ;R) =  ; regular equilibrium
(ii) W(1;R) = 1: bank-run equilibrium
Given a bank's reserve policy R; it is clear from Figure 4 that W  =  is a Nash equilibrium
if   fW holds, otherwise W  = 1 is the unique equilibrium.
Figure 5 shows in its left part a typical equilibrium constellation. The critical value fW is
a function of the bank's reserve policy R. In the right part of Figure 5, the equilibrium
correspondence for varying proportions  of consumers with high liquidity needs is displayed.
We will demonstrate in the next section, that the bank will always choose a reserve policy
which guarantees that the rationally expected withdrawals W0 =  are less than fW:
In a regular equilibrium, only consumers with high liquidity needs will withdraw their deposits
in Period 1; while in the bank-run equilibrium all depositors will withdraw their funds. The
bank-run equilibrium always exists. In contrast, a regular equilibrium exists only if aggregate
liquidity needs  are not too high. In line with the literature21, we will assume that the regular
equilibrium W  =  obtains whenever it exists.
20Strictly speaking, W(W ;R;W0) is a correspondence and there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium fW;
where all consumers with high liquidity needs and some consumers with low liquidity needs withdraw their
deposits. This mixed equilibrium, which we disregard, is obtained for `  1(fW ;R;W0) = 2(fW ;R;W0):
21See, for example, Diamond (1997) or Allen and Gale (2004).
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By choosing to withdraw their deposits or to leave them with the bank in Period 1, consumers
of type t can obtain the utility
vb(W ;R; t) = maxft  1(W ;R; ); 2(W ;R; )g: (15)
In Period 0; consumers face uncertainty about their type and the aggregate demand for liquidity
 : The Choquet expected utility of a deposit contract in Period 0 is given in the following
lemma.
Lemma 5. For a bank choosing reserve policy R in Period 0; the Choquet expected utility of
a consumer from a deposit contract is
CEUb(R; ) = [  h + (1  )  `] R+ [  2 + (1  )  `  1]  (1 R): (16)
Proof. See the appendix.
5.3. Banks' reserve policy. When choosing their reserve policy R banks implicitly also
determine the interest rates on deposits (Equation (11)). Competition forces banks to make
this choice in the interest of consumers. Hence, banks will choose R such that the consumers'
ex-ante Choquet expected utility CEUb(R; ); derived in Lemma 5, is maximized, subject to
the constraint that consumers with low liquidity needs do not withdraw funds in Period 1;
Equation (14). As solution of the decision problem,
choose R to maximize CEUb(R; )
subject to 1 + i2(R; )  `  [1 + i1(R; )] ;
one obtains the optimal reserve policy R: From Equation (16) and Assumption 1, it is imme-
diately clear that CEUb(R; ) is a strictly increasing function of R: Since i2(R; ) is strictly
decreasing and i1(R; ) strictly increasing in R, the constraint 1+i2(R
; ) = ` [1 + i1(R; )]
must be binding. Substituting from Equation (11), one obtains the following Lemma.
Lemma 6. If all consumers (voluntarily) deposit their wealth with the bank, then the optimal
reserve holdings are
R =
2  
2   + (1  )  `
: (17)
Notice that the optimal reserve holdings R do not depend on the degree of condence :
Moreover, the optimal reserve holdings R equal the aggregate money holdings of the optimal
contract Mo (); derived in Section 3.2.
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Figure 6: CEU of deposit contact
Substituting the optimal reserve policy R from Equation (17) into the Choquet expected
utility function CEU(R; ), Equation (16), yields
CEUb(R
; ) =
  2  [  h + (1  )  `] + (1  )  `  [  2 + (1  )  `  1]
2   + (1  )  `
(18)
Choosing its reserves appropriately, the bank can design a deposit contract which guarantees
consumers not just liquidity but also the cross subsidy required by the optimal contract. In
fact, if there is no uncertainty,  = 1; then a bank deposit contract will achieve the same
ex-ante expected utility as the optimal contract,
CEUb(R
; 1) =
2  [  h + (1  )  `]
2   + (1  )  `
= V o (1):
In Period 0; consumers can choose between a deposit contract and direct investment in the
assets as analyzed in Section 3.1. They will deposit their funds in a bank if the Choquet
expected utility of the deposit contract CEUb(R
; ) exceeds the Choquet expected return
from direct investment, V n (): A bank deposit contract allows consumers therefore to obtain
an ex-ante Choquet expected utility
V b () = maxfV n (); CEUb(R; )g:
Figure 6 shows V n () = maxf2 ;     h + (1    )  `g and CEUb(R; ): Let b denote
the level of condence for which V n () equals CEUb(R; ): In the left diagram, the case
V b (b) = 2 is illustrated. In this case, we have b < n: The right diagram of Figure 6 shows
the case V b (b) =     h + (1    )  ` and b > n: Lemma 7 provides a formal proof.
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Figure 7: Evaluation of intermediary institutions
Lemma 7. There is a unique value b 2 (0; 1) for which V n (b) = CEUb(R; b) holds.
Moreover, b > o:
Proof. See the appendix.
6. Banks or asset markets?
It remains to compare the ex-ante Choquet expected utility of the allocations achieved with
a secondary asset market and with a bank deposit contract. Depending on the degree of
condence consumers' preferences for these institutions of nancial intermediation vary.
Recall that o =
2 `
h ` is the degree of condence below which the optimal contract recom-
mends to invest all funds in the illiquid asset. The following result provides a full comparison
of these two institutions22.
Theorem 8. There exists a level of condence e 2 (o; 1) such that,
(i) for   o; consumers need no intermediation at all,
(ii) for o <  < e, consumers strictly prefer the secondary asset market,
(iii) for  > e; consumers strictly prefer bank deposit contracts.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 7 illustrates this result. Roughly speaking, three cases can arise. For degrees of
22In Spanjers (1999), mutual funds are also considered.
If asset-backed short-selling is not permitted, a single mutual fund can implement the optimal outcome. In
the more plausible case, however, that short-selling is allowed or the nancial system consists of a number of
competing mutual funds, the outcome of the asset market is obtained.
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condence below o, neither bank deposit contracts nor a secondary asset market can improve
upon the investment opportunities without intermediation. For a range of intermediate degrees
of condence, the secondary asset market dominates the bank deposit contract oered by
competing banks, while for high degrees of condence, consumers prefer the outcome of bank
deposit contracts over the secondary asset market allocation.
To obtain more insight into the reason for this ranking, consider the case of no ambiguity,
 = 1: The second column of the table below gives the ex-ante expected utility obtained with
these institutions. The fourth column indicates the state in which the worst utility occurs.
Expected utility Worst utility Worst state
No intermediation   h + (1  )  ` 2 (t; ) = (`; 0)
Asset market   h + (1  )  2 2 (t; ) = (`; 0)
Bank deposits R  h + (1 R)  2 `  [R + (1 R)  1] (t; ) = (`; 1)
Optimal contract Mo  h + (1 Mo )  2 2 (t; ) = (`; 0)
With no ambiguity and full condence, the secondary asset market guarantees consumers full
liquidity. Despite their ignorance about their individual liquidity needs, consumers obtain the
same ex-ante expected utility as if they invested their funds in the illiquid asset and withdrew
at par if they would turn out to be high types h: The worst case of a secondary asset market
occurs if all consumers have low liquidity needs,  = 0: Notice that the result of the asset
market does not depend on any institutional investment activity. This is the reason why the
asset markets cannot engineer the optimal cross subsidy from `-types to h-types.
With bank deposit contracts, the banks' investment policy R becomes crucial. Notice that
the optimal reserve holdings of a bank do not depend on the degree of condence. Moreover,
the optimal investment policy of a bank must mimic the investment of the optimal contract:
R =Mo =
  2
  2 + (1  )  `
:
While this investment policy can achieve the same ex-ante Choquet expected utility as the
optimal contract, if consumers have full condence in the probability distributions over indi-
vidual and aggregate liquidity needs, it makes the deposit contract delicately poised on the
accurate prediction of aggregate liquidity needs : In particular, for the deposit contract, the
worst case is the state where all consumers have high liquidity needs,  = 1; since banks would
be forced to liquidate their illiquid investment prematurely. Hence, the worst case of a deposit
contract `  [R + (1 R)  1] < ` is worse than simply holding money.
As the degree of condence runs from 1 to 0 the utility of the worst case becomes more im-
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portant relative to the expected utility. Hence, we nd that consumers' evaluation of nancial
institutions changes. There is a switch-over point e below which the expected utility ranking
of banks and the asset market is reversed.
7. Concluding remarks
So far, we have looked at our results from the point of view of a consumer assessing dierent
institutions of nancial intermediation. We have seen that this assessment depends crucially on
the consumers' degree of condence with respect to individual and aggregate liquidity needs.
There are however more general lessons of our analysis. The aggregate results of any institution
of nancial intermediation must be judged not only according to its expected outcomes but
also according to its worst outcome. These rankings may vary greatly. What makes one
institution ideal, if uncertainty is low, may make it vulnerable if uncertainty is high. Bank
deposit contracts require an active investment policy of banks. This opens up opportunities
for a better outcome than pure liquidity provision. An inappropriate reserve policy, on the
other hand, may do great harm.
Ambiguity about what \adequate reserve holdings" are, together with the spread between
normal expected outcomes and the outcome under a worst-case scenario, may also guide reg-
ulators of nancial institutions. Moreover, since nancial intermediaries may take part in
several institutions, their choice is likely to be inuenced by their ambiguity regarding critical
parameters such as aggregate liquidity needs.
Several important research questions remain beyond the scope of this paper. A careful analysis
as to whether bank deposit contracts can coexist with asset markets if agents have access to
both institutions. Since we conrm the results of Diamond (1997) for the case of expected
utility, it is likely that one may have to consider constraints on market participation even
with ambiguity. Ambiguity may, however, also provide a reason why consumers may choose
alternative nancial intermediary institutions. In an economy where the degree of condence
diers across the population, ranging from consumers facing extremely low degrees of ambigu-
ity to those with very high degrees of ambiguity, one may expect to see bank deposit contracts
coexist with asset markets. Consumers with low degrees of condence prefer the asset market,
while consumers with high degrees of condence may favour the bank deposit contract.
In still another institutional setting, one may nd consumers with high degrees of condence
providing equity for banks that oer deposit contracts, eectively insuring the consumers with
low degrees of condence. Such result would be in line with the ndings in Diamond (1997)
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for risk-averse consumers in the absence of ambiguity.
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Proofs
Proposition 4 Equilibrium in the asset market
There exists a unique equilibrium (qa();Ma ()) in the asset market satisfying
(i) qa() = 1 and Ma () = ; for  = 1;
(ii) qa() 2 (2h ; 1) and M

a () 2 ( 22+(1 )h ; ) for  2 (o; 1);
(iii) qa() =
2
h
and Ma () 2 [0; 22+(1 )h ]: for  2 [0; o];
yielding an ex-ante expected utility of
V a () =     qa()  h + (1    )  2:
Proof. The proof is organized as follows: In Part A, we transform the problem in a more
suitable equivalent form. In Part B, we consider two parameter constellations and derive the
equilibria.
Part A: Transformation of the problem
Let
v^a(m; q; t) = m Rm(q; t) + (1 m) Ra(q; t) (19)
= m maxft;
2
q
g+ (1 m) maxf2; t  qg:
For all q 2 [2h ;
2
`
] we have v^a(m; q; h) > v^a(m; q; `): Furthermore, v^a(m; q; `) is decreasing in
q: From qE( ;M)  2` it now follows that
min
(t;)2fh;`g[0;1]
v^a(m; q
E
a ( ;M); t) (20)
= min
q2[2
h
;
2
`
]
v^a(m; q; `) = m  ` + (1 m)  2:
Dene the function B(m; q) as
B(m; q) =   [  v^a(m; q; h) + (1  )  v^a(m; q; `)] + (1  )  min
q2[2
h
;
2
`
]
v^a(m; q; `): (21)
Using Equation (19) and Equation (20) it is easy to check that, for q 2 [2h ; 2` ]; the following
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equalities hold:
B(m; q; ) =  

 

m maxfh;
2
q
g+ (1 m) maxf2; h  qg

+(1  ) 

m maxf`;
2
q
g+ (1 m) maxf2; `  qg

+(1  )  [m  ` + (1 m)  2]
=  

  [m  h + (1 m)  q  hg] + (1  ) 

m  2
q
+ (1 m)  2g

+(1  )  [m  ` + (1 m)  2]
= m 

 

  h + (1  ) 
2
q

+ (1  )  `

+(1 m)  [  (  q  h + (1  )  2) + (1  )  2]
= m  v^m(q; ) + (1 m)  v^a(q; )
with
v^m(q; ) =

 

  h + (1  ) 
2
q

+ (1  )  `

; (22)
v^a(q; ) = [  (  q  h + (1  )  2) + (1  )  2] : (23)
Figure 8 shows these functions.
v^m(q; )
v^a(q; )
0 q
v^
2
h
2
`
.........
.........................................
.........................................
.........
()
2
()
2
`
()
Figure 8: v^m(q; ) and v^a(q; )
Recalling va(m;M; ; t) = bva(m; qE( ;M); t), one checks easily that the Choquet expected
utility satises:
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CEUa(m;M;) = B(m; q
E(;M); ):
Hence, (M; q) is an equilibrium, if M maximizes B(M; qE(;M); ) or, equivalently, if the
best-response correspondence argmaxM B(M; q
E(;M); ) has a xed point:
M 2 argmax
M
B(M; qE(;M); )
=
8<:
f0g for v^m(qE(;M); ) < v^a(qE(;M); )
[0; 1] for v^m(qE(;M); ) = v^a(qE(;M); )
f1g for v^m(qE(;M); ) > v^a(qE(;M); )
:
Part B: Equilibria
Case (i): Assume that () =   h + (1  )  ` > 2 holds.
In this case neither M = 0 nor M = 1 can be equilibria.
(a) Suppose M = 0: Then, from the analysis of the market for claims in Section 4.1, there
must be q such S(q) = 0: Hence, q  2h must be true. From Equations (22) and (23) it follows
that for q  2h
v^m(q; )  v^m(2
h
; ) = () > 2 = v^
a(
2
h
; )  v^a(q; )
holds, if () =  h+(1 )` > 2: Hence, for () > 2; one hasM = 1; a contradiction.
(b) Suppose M = 1: Then, from demand and supply for claims to the illiquid asset in Section
4.1, there must be q such D(q) = 0: Hence, q  2` must hold.
From Equations (22) and (23) it follows for q  2` that
v^m(q; )  v^m(2
`
; ) = (  ) < 2
`
 (  ) = v^a(2
`
; )  v^a(q; ):
Thus, M = 0; a contradiction.
(c) From (a) and (b) it follows that M 2 (0; 1): Therefore v^m(q; )  v^a(q; ) = 0 must hold.
This equation is equivalent to the quadratic equation
[    h]  q2 + [2       (2 + h)  (1  )  `)]  q   [  (1  )  2] = 0: (24)
Since   (1   )  2 > 0 holds, Equation (24) has a unique positive solution qa() 2 (2h ; 1]:
It requires a straightforward calculation to check that qa(1) = 1 and qa(o) =
2
h
; where
o =
2 `
h ` : Applying the implicit function theorem to v^
m(q; )   v^a(q; ) = 0; one checks
easily that qa() is strictly increasing in :
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At the price qa() consumers are indierent about their individual money holdings m: From
Equation (9) in Section 4.1 one has qa() =
1 
  M

a ()
1 Ma () and therefore obtains
Ma () =
  qa()
  qa() + (1  )
as the aggregate money holdings.
Moreover, from Equations (22) and (23), one gets
V a () = CEUa(M

a ();M

a (); )
= v^m(qa(); ) = v^
a(qa(); )
=   [  qa()  h + (1  )  2] + (1  )  2
=     qa()  h + (1    )  2:
This proves (i) and (ii) of the proposition.
Case (ii): Assume now that () =   h + (1  )  `  2 holds.
From Equations (22) and (23) it follows that
v^m(
2
h
; ) = ()  2 = v^a(2
h
; ):
For () < 2, one hasM

a () = 0. Since there is no demand for claims in Period 1; D(q) = 0;
the equilibrium price is qa(; 0) =
2
h
: Moreover, V a () = 2, since all consumers hold the
illiquid asset and no trade takes place in Period 1:
For () = 2; v^
m(2h
; ) = v^a(2h
; ): Hence, consumers are indierent about their investment
choice. Any aggregate money holdings Ma between 0 and Ma (o) =
2
2+(1 )h will be an
equilibrium in the market for claims in Period 1: In this case, one has V a () = v^m(
2
h
; ) =
v^a(2h
; ) = 2: This proves case (iii) of the proposition.
Lemma 5: For a bank choosing reserve policy R in Period 0; the Choquet expected utility of
a consumer from a deposit contract is
CEUb(R; ) = [  h + (1  )  `] R+ [  2 + (1  )  `  1]  (1 R):
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Proof. Consider the following computations:
CEUb(R; )
=  
Z
[  vb( ;R; h) + (1  )  vb( ;R; `)]  p() d + (1  )  min
(t;)2fh;`g[0;1]
vb( ;R; t)
=   [  vb(;R; h) + (1  )  vb(;R; `)] + (1  )  min
(t;)2fh;`g[0;1]
vb( ;R; t)
=   f maxfh  1(;R; ); 2(;R; )g + (1  )maxf`  1(;R; ); 2(;R; )gg
+(1  )  `  [R+ 1  (1 R)]
=   f  h  (1 + i1(R; ) ) + (1  )  (1 + i2(R; )g+ (1  )  `  [R+ 1  (1 R)]
= [  h + (1  )  `] R+ [  2 + (1  )  `  1]  (1 R):
The rst equality follows from the denition of Choquet expected utility (Equation (1)). The
second equality uses Assumption 2, and the third equality follows from Equation (15). The
forth equality is implied by Equations (12) and (13). The last equality uses Equation (11).
Lemma 7: There is a unique value b 2 (0; 1) for which V n (b) = CEUb(R; b) holds.
Moreover, b > o:
Proof. The critical value b is implicitly dened by the equation CEUb(R
; b) V n (b) = 0:
CEUb(R
; ) is linear and strictly increasing in  and V n () = maxf2 ;  h+(1  )`g
is piecewise linear in : Figure 6 illustrates the two possible cases.
Denote by b1 the unique solution of the equation CEUb(R
; b1) 2 = 0 and by b2 the also
unique solution of CEUb(R
; b2)  b2    h   (1  b2  )  ` = 0:
Since CEUb(R
; ) is strictly increasing in ; b1  b2 holds. The values b1 and b2 can be
computed explicitly as
b = maxfb1; b2g
= max

(2   `)  2   + (2   `  1)  (1  )  `
(h   `)  2   + (2   `  1)  (1  )  `
;
(1  1)  2`
(h   `)  (2   `)   + `  (2   1  `)

:
Straightforward computations show
b1   o =
(2   `)  2   + (2   `  1)  (1  )  `
(h   `)  2   + (2   `  1)  (1  )  `
  2   `
h   `
=
[(2   `  1)  (1  )  `]  2    (h   2)
[(h   `)  2   + (2   `  1)  (1  )  `]  (h   `)
> 0:
Thus, b = maxfb1; b2g  b1 > 0:
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Theorem 8: There exists some level of condence e 2 (o; 1) such that,
(i) for   o; consumers need no intermediation at all,
(ii) for o <  < e, consumers strictly prefer the secondary asset market,
(iii) for  > e; consumers strictly prefer bank deposit contracts.
Proof. We know from Lemma 7 that b > o =
2 `
h ` holds. Moreover, from Proposition
4 and Equation (18), it is clear that V o (o) = V a (o) = 2 and V o (1) = V b (1) > V

a (1) are
true. We will show that (i) V a is a strictly increasing and convex function of  on the interval
(o; 1) and then that (ii) V

a (b) > V

b (b) holds.
(i) V a is a strictly increasing and convex function of  on (o; 1):
We consider rst the function qa() which is implicitly dened by Equation (24),
[    h]  qa()2 + [2       (2 + h)  (1  )  `)]  qa()  [  (1  )  2]  0:
Let A =   h; B = 2   `; C = `     (2 + h); D =  (1   )  2; then this equation
may be written equivalently as
A    qa()2 + [B + C  ]  qa() +D    0: (25)
By Assumption 1, one has A > 0; B > 0, D < 0 and A+B + C +D = 0: Denote by
 = 2 A    qa() +B + C  
= A    qa() 
D  
qa()
> 0:
The second equality follows from Equation (25), the inequality follows since  2 [0; 1]; qa() 2
[2h
; 2`
]; A > 0 and D < 0:
Dierentiating Equation (25) with respect to  yields
A  qa()2 + 2 A    qa()  q0a () +B  q0a () + C  qa() + C    q0a () +D  0: (26)
Solving for q0a () one obtains
q0a () =  
A  qa()2 + C  qa() +D

=
B  qa()
  > 0: (27)
where the second equality uses again Equation (25). The inequality follows since B > 0: This
establishes that qa() is a strictly increasing function of :
Dierentiating V a (); as in Equation (10),
V a () =     qa()  h + (1    )  2;
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with respect to  yields
@V a ()
@
=   (qa()  h   2) +     h  q0a () (28)
  

2
h
 h   2

+     h  q0a ()
=     h  q0a () > 0:
The weak inequality follows from qa()  2h , the strict inequality from Equation (27). Hence,
V a () is a strictly increasing function of :
Dierentiating Equation (28) again with respect to  yields
@2V a ()
@2
=   h 

2  q0a () +   q00a ()

(29)
which is positive if 2  q0a () +   q00a () > 0 holds. In order to establish this inequality, we
dierentiate the identity in Equation (26) with respect to ;
q00a () +

4 A    qa()  q0a () + 2 A    q0a ()2 + 2  C  q0a ()
  0:
Solving for q00a (); we have
q00a () =  
1

 4 A    qa()  q0a () + 2 A    q0a ()2 + 2  C  q0a () : (30)
Hence,
2  q0a () +   q00a ()
=
1

 2   q0a ()     4 A    qa()  q0a () + 2 A    q0a ()2 + 2  C  q0a ()
=
2  q0a ()

 B  A  2  q0a ()
=
2  q0a ()



B  A  2  B  q

a()
 

=
2 B  q0a ()
2
 [A    qa() +B + C  ]
=
2 B  q0a ()
2


 D  
qa()

> 0
where the rst equality uses Equation (30), the second equality follows by straightforward
computations, the third equality uses Equation (27) and the forth equality follows again from
straightforward computations. The nal equality uses the identity in Equation (25).
In combination with the second-order derivative of V a () in Equation (29) this establishes
convexity of the function V a ():
(ii) V a (b) > V b (b):
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We consider two cases: b = b1 > b2 and b = b2 > b1:
Case (i): Suppose b = b1: By denition of b1; V

b (b1) = CEUb(R
; b1) = 2: Since V a is a
strictly increasing function on (o; 1); and b1 > o by Lemma 7, we have V

a (b) > V

a (o) =
2 = V

b (b1) = V

b (b); where the last equation follows by the hypothesis b = b1:
Case (ii): Suppose now b = b2 > b1 > o: As V

a is a strictly increasing and strictly convex
function on (o; 1) and both illiquid asset and money are held, we have Va() > Vn() for all
 2 (o; 1]: So by denition of b2 we have V a (b2) > V b (b2):
Since V b (1) > V

a (1) and V

b (b) < V

a (b) hold, V

a is a strictly increasing and convex function
of  on (o; 1); and V

b () is a strictly increasing and linear function of  on (b; 1); by the
intermediate value theorem, there must be a unique e 2 (b; 1) such that V a (e) = V b (e) holds.
For values of  2 (o; e), we have V a () > V b (); for values  2 (e; 1], we have V b () > V a ();
and for  2 [0; o), V a () = V b () = 2:
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